

SOUL OF MAN UNDER
SOCIALISM 271

the author is what he is* It ljo.s nothing to do
wich the fa^t
that other people want what they want. Indeed,
the m<j::it'nt
that an artist takes notice of what other
people want, an ;
tries to supply the demand, he ceases to be an
artist, and
becomes a dull or an amusing craftsman, an
honest or a dishonest tr^'l-smari. He has no further cLilr.i to
be considered
as an anise. Art is the most intense mode of
Individualism
that the vrorld has known. I am :n:lined to
say that it is
the only real mode of Individualism that the world
has known.
Crime, which, under certain conditions, may
s^em to have
created Individualism, mo^t take cognizance of
other people
and interfere with them. It belongs to the
sphsre of action.
But alone, without any reference to his
rieij^r'ojsr, without
any interference, the artist can fashion a heci'i-
iful tiling; and
if he does not do it soltily for his own pl^asurs, Le
is nc<t an
artist at rjl.

And it is to be noted that it Is the fact that Art is
this Intense
form of Individualism tliat makes the public try
to exercise
over it an authority that is as immoral as it is
ridiculous, and
as corrupting as it is contemptible. It is not quite
their fault.
The public has always, and in every age, been
badly brought
up. They are continually asking Art to be
popular, to please
their want of taste, to flatter their absurd vanity,
to tell them
what they have been told before, to show them
what they
ought to be tired of seeing, to amuse them
when they feel
heavy after eating too much, and to distract
their thoughts
when they are wearied of their own stupidity. Now
Art should
never try to be popular. The public should try to
make itself
artistic. There is a very wide difference. If a man
of science
were told that the results of his experiments, and
the conclu-
sions that he arrived at, should be of such a
character that
they would not upset the received popular
notions on the
subject, or disturb popular prejudice, or hurt the
sensibilities
of people who knew nothing about science; if a
philosopher
were told that he had a perfect right to speculate
in the highest
spheres of thought, provided that he arrived at
the same con-
clusions as were held by those who had never
thought in any
sphere at all—well, nowadays the man of science
and the
philosopher would be considerably amused. Yet
it is really
a very few years since both philosophy and science
were sub-
jected to brutal popular control, to authority in
fact—the

authority of either the general ignorance of the
community,
or the terror and greed for power of an
ecclesiastical or